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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
THI~

S'l1 A'l'E O.B1 U'l'AH,
Pla'ir1tiff aud Respondent,
vs.

RICHARD l<JARiL LANCAS'CER
'
Defendant and Appellant.

Case No.

10787

BIUEF OF APPELLANT

STATKMENT OF KIND OF CASE
'l'his is an appeal from a verdict of guilty by a jury
and a sentencP to one year in the C'ounty jail on a charge
of involuntary manslaughte1·.

DlSPOSI'ClON LN

'1 Hl~ LOWI~R
1

COURT

The defendant was eharg<'d with involuntary man~langhkr in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, convicted
hy a jury, and sPnteneed hy .Judge Marcellus K. Snow
tn ilH· rnaximnm of one year in the eounty jail.
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REILIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks a reversal of the verdict and •J·udir_
b
ment.

STA'l1 E.MENT OF FAC'l'S
Bobby Davis, the 5-year-old step::.;on of the defendant, was struck numerous times with a belt, thP reason
for the chastisement being eitlwr to stop him from holding his breath in the bathtub to tlw point of losing
consciousness (R 97), which lw had done before, causing
his parents great concern (R. 99-100) from the statement of the defendant, or as 1mnislnnent for pulling
down the bathroom curtains. He was struck 8everal
times with a doubled belt, ''He didn't recall how many
times" (R. 97), when he noticed the boy wasn't breathing ( R. 97) ; some type of moisture wa8 corning out of
the boy's mouth. The defendant tried mouth-to-mouth
resuscitation without success (R 98).
Thereafter the child was rmd1Pd to the Cottonwood
Hospital where he was determined to be dt~ad by Dr.
Horne.
Dr. Shelley Swift, pathologist whose qualification~
were stipulated to, did an autopsy on the deceased the
next day, finding numerous brni8t>S and superficial abrasions on the bodv confined to the right 8ide of the> face,
right side of the forehead and right ear, on the buttocks
and one hrnisP on thP snoturn and hasp of thl' peni~
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IR 79). He deh•rn1i1wd that the cam;e of death was
due "to aspiration of vomitus in the lungs" (R. 80).
'!'he witness testified that the combination of all the
factors of trauma would not be ~mff icient to be disabling
or incapacitating to a normal child of' that age in his
daily routine ( R. 85) ; that the actual trauma ibielf is
not sufficient to eau:;.w death ( R. 84-) ; that aspiration
of vomitus may be caused by emotional upsd (R. 86).
In answer to the question, "I'll ask you, Doctor, is
there any probability of death from that amount of
trauma \Yithout the intervening basis of the aspiration~"
the witness testifiPd as follows:
A.

"You say any?

Q.

Probability. I'm not asking about possibility;
probability.

A.

No, sir.

Q.

'l'hen, am 1 correct in stating that if this child
hadn't aspirated the vornitus, the regurgitation, that death would not probably have
arisen from the trauma to the buttocks, the
scrotum, the ehePk or any combination thereof 1
0

A.

'l'hat 's right.

Q.

Now you indicate also, I believe, that there
' .
'
an• many. thinO"s
that <'an cause this aspiran
hon, is that correct?

.\.

lTh-huh .
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Q.

And one of them is emotions, is that correct'?
And emotional upset combined with crying'/

A.

Combined with erying.

Q.

And I'll - emotional upset need not he
caused by pain, need it, Doctod

A.

No, Sir.

Q.

Might be caused by fear, is that correcU

A.

Yes.

Q.

Or anger1

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Or a tantrum?

A.

Well-

Q.

Doctor, do you have an opm10n from your
medical practice as to how often an aspiration is caused in a child of the age of five to
six years from an emotional status 1

A.

How often an aspiration is caused'?

Q.

That's correct.

A.

I believe I just got through saying it is not
seen in just simple emotion. It requires an
act of crying along with it.

Q.

All right. An emotional status eombinecl
with crying in a ehild of this age 'I
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A.

Yt~S, when a d1ild is crymg they exhaust
tlwmselvP;; of air and have to breath before
tlwy cornplPkly PXlld the vomitus. It's pure
emotional will eanse this.

Q.

But it must be eomhined with the crying1

A.

Crying, yes.

Q.

Do you have an opinion base<l on your medical ex1wrience how often this combination of
things O<'curs with the child in this age group,
that is, five to six years old 'I

A.

1 don't have any statistics, no.

Q.

Ho\v many times have you seen this condition
in a child of that age in your practice'?

A.

Oh, about threP or four times.

Q.

Out of how many children of that age that
you've examined; autopsy?

A.

I can recall about three
the last about ten years.

Q.

As 1 sa:-», how many children of that age that
you've performed autopsies with or examined"?

A.

Not many.

Q.

l don't think ~·ou'r<' understanding me, Doctor. You say you've had three or four. Now,
I'm asking you how many children of that
age have you examined or performed autopsiPs ov<'l' that same period'?

casP~

we've had in
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A.

Are you talking ahout ('hildren ill with diseases or children involved in these things?

Q.

Children involved with trauma.

A.

There wouldn't be mort> than about ten or
fifteen.

Q.

Do ~-ou have an opinion hasPd on n•a:--;rmablf•
medical cprtainty a:--; to 1d1dher a basis of
a:--;piration from a combination of crying and
emotion would be fort>secable on chastisement of a child.

A.

No, sir. I have no information on that."
(R. 87-89)

He further testified that the bruise on the scrotum
between the legs, in all likelihood, could not have been
caused by a trashing with a belt; also, that the bruise
could have been up to five hours old ( R. 91). Again at
R. 91, he testified as follows:
Q.

"Now, once more, Doctor. fa it at all probable that the combination of all the trauma
you found evidence of without the intervening basis of the aspiration causing death of
this child?

A.

No, sir."

At R. 92:
Q.

"Can you state with any degree of certainty,
Doctor, what did eamw the regurgitation
and/or the cryingt
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A.

No, with ('ertainty, no, sir.' '

CounsPl for dRf Pndant llt<Hh~ a motion for dismissal
on the failure of th<' Stak to makP a prirna facia case
at thl' <·nd of the State's evidence.
Defrn<lant did not tl'stify but his statement to the
officers i111llll'diat<'ly followi11g th(· trngP(l>- \\'as testified
to h:v Captain Andrns of thP Sltniff\.; DPpartment, \\'ithont objection.
Deft•ndant's ('OUnsel rene\\'ed his motion to dismiss
in the nature~ of a motion for directed verdict, upon both
sides resting.
The court denied both motions, the ,jury retired and
eame in with a verdict, being followed by the judgment,
both of whieh an• hen~ appealed.
POIN"'l'S ON" APPEAL
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE
VERDICT.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AT THE END OF THE STATE'S CASE.
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT AT THE CLOSE OF ALL
THE EVIDENCE.
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POINT IV

THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 6.

ARGUMEN'l1
The four points listed herein while teelmically separate points are so interlaced with the law and facts
applicable thereto that they will be discussed together.
The defendant was charged under 76-30-5(2), Utah
Code Annotated 1953, which defines manslaughter and
reads as follows :
"(2) Involuntary, in the conunission of an unlawful act not amounting to a felony, or in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death,
in an unlawful manner or without due caution and
circumspection.''
The information (R. 1) charges as follows:
" . . . INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER, in
violation of Title 76, Chapter 30, SE>ction 5 (2),
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as follows, to-wit:
"That on or about the 8th day of November 19G5
at the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, the
said RICHARD EARL LANCAS'l1 ER, unlawfully killed Robert Lee Davis without malice;"
The information does not set out nor did the State differentiate between the two breakdowns of subsection (2)
of 76-30-5, Utah Code Annotah•d 1953, supra, and in no
place did they allege an unlawful aet not a11101mting to
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a felon)·· In no plaet• did tht>)' prove a lawful act whicl1
1night vroduee death in an unlawful manner or without
rllw ('aution or eir('Ulllsp<•ction.

'l'he doctor perforrning the autorrny, an admittedly
qualified vathologist, testified as set forth in the statement of facts, supra, that death was caused "by aspiration of vornitus." ~fo further te::;tified that the combination of all or any of the injuries evidenced by trauma
to tlw body not only would not cause death, but further
stated ( R. 87-S!J) that in his opinion there was no probability of them eausing death in the absence of the
;nterwning basis of the aspiration. In fact, he testified
that tlw trauma would not even limit the child in its
<laily activities.
'l'ht• annotation at 26 A.L.R. 192, citing Copeland v.
Trn11., ,'J&J SW 'Jd J{;r.;, ',v-hjeh is fart.ReF aHH:otated at
Trn11., :28fi 8TV .'2d :)G:'S, which is further annotated at
-+9 A.L.R. (i05. states:
"'l'o warrant a eonvidion for this homicide, the
death must he tht> natural probable consequence
of the unla,vfnl act and not the result of an independent inkrveni11g eause in which the accused
did not participatP a:nd which he could not foresee."
Dr. ~wift tPstifiL'd that 11Hm)· things - fear, anger,
tantnmrn, as well as pain - <:ould cause an emotional
11p:-.:pt l'P~rnlting in regurgitation followed by aspiration.
Dr. Swift wa:-; vt•ry eareful to point out that any
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opinion he had as to causation arising- from trauma wa~
on an indirect basis and that the dt•ath did not result
directly from this trauma.
Citing from 31 A.L.R. 2d another annotation on
manslaughter at page 704, the ease of Witt v. Comm011wealth, a 1947 case, 305 Ky. 31 . 202 SW2d 612, in which
there was evidence that the deceased had bet>n assaulted,
the defendants were in a highly intoxicated condition.
After a conviction the court reversed, using the following language :

"In establishing that death is the result of a
criminal agency, it is not sufficient merely to
establish that a crime has been committed; death
must be shown to have been the result of the crime
proved. It is not always necessary to prove the
cause of death by medical testimony.... Such a
fact, as any other, may be proved by circumstantial evidence. But where circumstantial evidence
alone is relied upon to establish the cause of
death, the facts proved must be such that a layman of average intelligence would know of his
own knowledge, gained from his own experience,
that the injuries described are sufficient to produce death. . . . Since the medical testimony as
to the cause of death was neutral, the jury eoul<l
determine that death resulted from a criminal
agency only from the nature of the wounds described; and such determination in a criminal
case must be made to the exclusion of a reasonablP
doubt. Applying the rule in the cases above cited:
We have evidence of death; we also have evidence
that the crime of assault and battery was com
mitted; but we do not havP clear and cogent (•vi-
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d(•ncP that (lf'ath was tlw n•sult of the crime. Bv
d<'ar and ('Og<'nt PvideneP we do not mean th;t
the evidPneP must hP without contradiction, or
such as to <·011mnrnd lwlief; hut it must present
mon· than a lllPl"e 1wssihility of the existence of
the fact or the happening of the act which the
jun· is called on to deh·nnine. . . . Because the
wounds observed hy thl' attending physician were
of such superfieial eharacter, he refused to expn•ss an opinion that the foree which produced
thern eaused the death of tlw 1w1·son upon who
tlH•y WPn' inflicted; and, for the same reason, we
hold that the:- do not prel-ient eogent evidence for
the Court or jury to so conelud(• as an ultimate
fact. rrlrnt ht>ing true, the Commonwealth failed
to c•stahlish the corpus delicti, not because the
eviclene<' fail::; to show that death occurred or that
a ni11w was eo111mitkd, hut beeause it fails to
slum· that thP nime, if committed, was the cause
of death."
As thP comt will notP, in the \Vitt case the physician
\\'a8 1wutral all to tlt(' eaus(• of death. In this case, Dr.

s,,ift was not only not nPntral, but was emphatic in this
stnte111enh-: that the trauma not only would not, but could
not, hav<· (•ansnl tlw dt-ath. His finding as the cause of
rkath was explicit asphyxiation.

aspiration of vomitus causing

His testimon:· was also explicit that it

would reqnin• an P1110tional hasis.
Tlwn· is no eYidPncP by tlw

~tah'

what8oever to

show that such a mattPr is f<n'<'sPPable. Counsel for the
defendant in his n•qm•sted instruction No. G, whieh was
i\"fnsPd Ji:· tlH· court (H. 11 ), ask('d the court to instruct

a:-; to forPs<'('ahilit~·. As in<li<'a.tt-d, the court rl'fused.
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Counsel made a motion for a dismissal at the end
of the State's case based on the State's failure to prove
that the cause of death was (a) in the commission of
an unlawful act not amounting to a felony, or (b) in
the commission of a lawful act which might produce
death in an unlawful manner or without due caution
and circumspection.
Unfortunately, most of the cases in this State under
76-30-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, which have had
occasion to go to the Appellate Court were the various
cases arising from criminal negligence or recklessness
in the handling of automobiles prior to our legislation
on negligent homicide and automobile homicide, some
of those cases being State v. Lingnwn, 97 Utah 180,

State v. Barker, 113 Utah 514, 192 P2d 723,
and State v. Adamson, 101 Utah 534, 125 P2d 492. In
91 P2d 457,

all those cases, the implication is that the negligence or
recklessness to replace intent comes from driving of
an automobile in such a manner as to create an implication that it may or will have a propensity to cause death
or grave bodily injury. In the instant case, there is no
evidence or implication that the nature of the chastisement of the child by the defendant would cause death or
grievous bodily injury. The only evidence is that of
the State's expert's opinion - a combination of all the
trauma would not be sufficient to cause death, nor would
it seriously impair a youngster of that age in his normal
daily activities.

13.
In the annotation::; of :31 A.L.R :2d, ::oupra, at sublwad G, page 7lU, then' ai·e <·el'tain ca::o<'s upholding finding:,; by layrnvn wl1ere then· wa::; an ahsence of medical
1t·stirnon)·. ln tlw instant cmw, there i::o no such absence,
lint on the eo11trnr:», th<' testimony of a highly qualified
pathologist.

'L'he State did not allege connnission of a crime not
m11onnting to a frlony, nor did the)c prnve one. 'rhe
State furtlwr failed to prove the cause of an injury between the ehild 's lL·g::;, the only testimony being that of
Dr. Swift that cltastiselllent with a belt, as shown by
the testimonial Pvidenee and the bruises on the buttocks
and lPgs, \\'as improbable as the cause of that bruise.
However, a certain pictmc, Exhibit No. 7, indicates the
nature and position of the hruise or contusion, and the
pidure::; of tht> clt>ad infant (considering their naturP
and the age of the child) must neeessarily be inflammatory to the jmy.
Fnd(•r all tlw Pviden<:e in this case, it being all that
of the State, the matter should not have bPen allowed
to go to tlw jury. The dPfondant ltlade proper motions
both for a disrnis:-;al and for a din·dPd VPrdict after the
<k'fendant had restecl, without putting on evidence. Defondant fnrtlt('J' 1·pqn('::ilt'd an inl'itrndion requiring forect'c'ahility of th(• likt>lihood of death arising under the
vhra:-;(' in the statute, rn-:m-r-l(2), Utah Code Aunotated
1953: " . . . a lawful ad whieh might produce death in
u11 unlawful niannPI' without duP caution or circumSpPdion.'' rl'1H' C'ourt !'!'fn:-wd to give' such an instruction.
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CONCLU8ION
It is our contention, as set forth in points on appeal,
that:

diet.

1. 'l1he evidence is insuffieient to support the ver-

2. The evidence being in the statm; as shown by
the transcript, the court should have granted the de-

fendant's motion to dismiss at the end of the 8tate's case.

3. rrhe court should have granted defendant's lllOtion for a directed verdict, either as verbally read into
the record or by giving defendant's n'quested instruction No. 1 (R. 8).
4. The jury was not pro1wrly instructed as to the
requirement of foreseeability or prohahility of dl:'ath or
grievous bodily injury.

It is respectfully submitted that the verdict of the
jury and the judgment of the trial court should be reversed and the casl:' dismissed.

HATCH & McRAJ;~
Attorneys for Defendant
707 Boston Building
8alt Lake City, Ptah 84111

